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Abstract 
Stephen Elstub articulates that deliberative democracy, as a theory, can be seen as having gone 
through various distinct generations. The first generation was a period where the normative 
values and the justifications for deliberative democracy were set out. This prompted criticism 
from difference democrats who saw the exclusion of other forms of communication by the 
reification of reason in deliberation as a serious shortcoming of the theory. This in part 
prompted the growth of the second generation of deliberative democracy, which began to focus 
more on the theory’s operability. These theorizations, from the mostly 1990s and early 2000s, 
have led to the third generation of the theory—one embodied by the empirical turn. Elstub uses 
this genealogy as a foundation from which to argue that the current focus of deliberative 
democracy is on implementing deliberative systems rather than only deliberative institutions 
and this could potentially represent a fourth generation of deliberative democracy.  
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Gagnon: How do you conceptualize democracy? 
Elstub: I usually start by going back to the traditional, original meaning of rule by the people. 
But that still leaves a massive scope for interpretation. What do we mean by “the people”? 
What do we mean by “rule”? And what do we mean by “rule by”? (A similar disambiguation 
of “rule by the people” was given by Held [2014].) All of the former questions can be subject 
to a large number of different interpretations. I agree with Michael Saward (2002) that 
democracy is the contest over its meaning. The classic statement made by Walter Bryce 
Gallie (1956), that democracy is an essentially contested concept, means that there isn’t a 
single agreed meaning about democracy that everyone is going to share. However, I think 
you can say more than just that. Democracy can be conceived as being scalar. It is scalar in 
the sense that it is something you can have more or less of. I quite like David Beetham’s 
(1994) rather general definition of democracy, which gives a scalar approach that allows for 
things to be measured as more or less democratic. Beetham defines democracy as a model of 
decision making about collectively binding rules and policies over which people exercise 
control. And the most democratic arrangement would be that all members of the collectivity 
enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision making directly. The scalar element 
is there: more direct citizen input into decision making about binding rules and policies the 
more democratic. Similarly the more equal this input the more democratic. However, I also 
agree with Albert Weale (2007), who says that there needs to be a sortal element to 
definitions of democracy. We need to be able to acknowledge the fact that some 
arrangements are democratic while others are plainly not. We need to be able to have the 
capacity to say, “This isn’t democratic but this is.” So you do need a sortal element alongside 
the scalar element.  
 
Gagnon: Democracy as something contested, scalar, and sortal. Your conceptualization 
recognizes the uncertainty over democracy’s meaning, but also that it needs to be both 
measurable and classifiable. There’s a tension between uncertainty and certainty in your 
answer which, I think, is a condition pre-empted by scholars of democracy who, today, are 
giving very careful disclosures about what they consider to be democracy or democratic 
before advancing their arguments on such things. Where does deliberative democracy fit into 
this? 
 Elstub: I think deliberative democracy has become more amorphous and diverse. In some 
ways that’s a good thing. You don’t want the definition of anything to be static or fixed—or 
too reified. It needs to be contingent. It must have the ability to adapt and to develop with 
change in circumstances, change in ideas, and change in interpretations. But definitions of 
democracy and deliberative democracy are not imprisoned by their many interpretations and 
ideologies that make both seem morphological. There are some core concepts in play that we 
can use to determine whether something is a democracy or a deliberative democracy. These 
core concepts provide boundaries for valid interpretations to be made so that we are not left 
with the meaningless and vacuous use of these terms where basically they come to mean 
anything to anyone. In deliberative democracy there’s a little bit of danger that that has 
already happened. The huge amount of work that has gone into deliberative democracy in the 
last decade, especially empirical research, has led to a number of concepts falling into 
deliberative democracy that really shouldn’t be. People are, for example, implying that if 
there is any dialogue or conversation observable among participants that deliberative 
democracy is occurring. That’s too general and, as I hope to show in this interview, a 
specious argument.  
Deliberative democracy is something more specific than a group of people talking. I 
have tried (e.g., Elstub 2006, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012, 2014) to offer a definition 
that incorporates the different interpretations that exist about deliberative democracy. My 
definition tries to put some boundaries on deliberation altogether. I think it can be split into 
two parts. You’ve got the democracy part, which can be justified by articulating that there is 
collective decision making and the participation of relevant actors. And then you’ve got the 
deliberative part, which goes back to Bohman and Rehg’s (1997) definition. They see 
deliberation as a dialogical process in the exchange of reason for the purpose of resolving 
problematic situations that cannot be settled through interpersonal coordination or 
cooperation. Here we have a preference for different positions, the determination of existing 
preferences, and the formation of new preferences. These are central to deliberation. Overall, 
the definition of deliberative democracy has a general core that most deliberative democrats 
could, I think, agree to: it is the making of collective decisions involving the participation of 
relevant actors. The more equal the participation the more democratic it will be through the 
consideration and exchange of reason aimed at the transformation of preferences. 
 
Gagnon: How does deliberative democracy differ in this case from associational democracy? 
 
Elstub: I have, in my work, tried to discuss deliberative and associational democracy 
together. The argument I make is that they are two different models of democracy. They both 
have weaknesses. The key weakness of deliberative democracy is its practicality. How can it 
actually be operationalized, institutionalized, and made into something that can work in life 
outside of the mind? The problem with associational democracy is that it can lead to the 
pursuit of private interests and the mischief of factionalism. My contention is that by 
combining the two you can enable the strength of both to be enhanced. The two models can 
be together developed and actualized while, at the same time, avoiding some of their 
weaknesses.  
This wouldn’t be a perfect system. No democracy is. But I think that deliberative and 
associational democracy can be mutually supportive. Deliberative democracy is a specific 
approach to a set of principles about how decisions should be made, whereas associational 
democracy is a type of institutional focus. I define the latter as a model of participatory 
democracy based on the self-governance of internally democratic voluntary and functional 
groups. By combining the two, associational democracy helps deliberative democracy 
overcome the social and practical issues that make deliberative democracy so hard to achieve. 
One issue for deliberative democracy is scale: it is difficult to get everybody together to make 
decisions together. It is the time that decision making requires, its space logistics, and so on 
at the higher scale that makes things difficult. But if you use the approach of associational 
democracy, where ultimately decisions are being devolved to specific associations, then those 
issues of scale are potentially alleviated.  
Complexity and diversity are other pertinent problems for deliberative democracy, as 
that democratic form looks for the exchange of all relevant reasons. In plural and diverse 
societies that means a whole lot of different reasons and perspectives. But associations 
specialize around certain types of identities, interests, beliefs, and opinions and are therefore 
quite good at communicating and representing those different discourses. Devolving to 
associations can help deliberative democracy deal with the issues around pluralism. We 
should also consider the need for scientific knowledge and expertise in deliberation (as it is 
inherently based on reason), which is a real challenge for deliberative democracy. Again, 
associations are good at developing, for example, levels of scientific expertise. Associations 
can be very specific. They can develop high levels of expertise in a particular field. And they 
are quite good at communicating this expertise but also representing it. We also see 
globalization as a problem for deliberative democracy, which perhaps enhances all of the 
other issues we discussed above. Associations are flexible and diverse. They can operate 
from local, regional, national, transnational, and global levels. That flexibility can help 
deliberative democracy adapt to the issues of complexity spurred on by globalization.  
I argue that we should make associations themselves democratic and deliberative. We 
should make the interactions between associations democratic and deliberative. Both 
propositions are each huge challenges—I accept that—but I do think it’s possible. This takes 
us to the use of public reason in associations. Sacralizing public reason within institutions can 
take away the pursuit of self-interest and the mischief of factionalism. Accusations of, for 
example, self-interest and factionalism have been famously leveled at civil society and 
associational models of democracy. There is a way for associations to meet this criticism. In 
order to try to justify their preferences, beliefs, and attitudes on certain issues, associations 
need to adopt public reason, which means that they have to slow down to focus on the 
common good and not on their own private interest. Combined, deliberative and associational 
democracy are consequently mutually supportive. Deliberative democracy is a mode of, and 
an approach to, making decisions. Associational democracy is a specific set of institutions. 
They can be deliberative, but there is no reason why they necessarily would be if they didn’t 
have to be; which is why we need to focus on making them democratic and deliberative. I 
think that associations of the democratic and deliberative sort can contribute significantly to 
the success of deliberative democracy. These are all issues dealt with in-depth in my first 
book (Elstub 2008).  
 
Gagnon: Can you tell us the story of how deliberative democracy broke apart into tautology 
or, in the words of Agamben (2011), amphibology? 
 
Elstub: There have been a number of good statements on the breakup of deliberative 
democracy. I’ll offer my own reflection—which I think touches on a number of the other 
existing statements. I’ve written, for instance, about deliberative democracy’s breakup in an 
article for the Political Studies Review called the “Third Generation of Deliberative 
Democracy.” I think that’s where we are now. The third generation of deliberative democracy 
has a much greater focus on practice and institutionalizing deliberative democracy. 
Something embodied by the empirical turn. That’s to be welcomed. But it is in that focus on 
practice, in that engagement with empirical evidence, where we’ve seen the diversity and 
amphibology of deliberative democracy develop. To try to answer the question fully, I’ll give 
the narrative of what I think the three generations of deliberative democracy are. It’s a 
heuristic that gives us one idea of what deliberative democracy’s genealogy might be. That 
then will give a fuller picture of how this breakup occurred. 
If we go back to the origins of deliberative democracy we have to talk about Jurgen 
Hambermas (e.g., 1985a, 1985b, 1991) and John Rawls (e.g., 1999, 2001, 2005). Habermas 
and Rawls give two distinct interpretations of Kant (1781, [1788] 1898, 1790) and his idea of 
public reason. What we see with Habermas and Rawls is that they are debating the normative 
justifications of deliberative democracy. That is a key component of the theory and where 
deliberative democracy’s great strength originates. The normative justifications for the theory 
were the first stage of the development of deliberative democracy. However, what Habermas 
and Rawls didn’t do is take into account the sheer complexity of contemporary societies. 
Their theories are normative and were criticized for being utopian—for being impractical and 
counterfactual, as Habermas freely admits. The ideal of deliberative democracy—that 
exchange of pure reason under the auspices of selflessness, the authentic concern for 
advancing the greater good, and the genuine will to issue resolution—is a methodological 
fallacy. It is never going to happen. Yet, although it is a counterfactual ideal, it nonetheless 
can inform practice. The ideal can act as a very good way of criticizing practice. It can be a 
norm that we can try to approximate. But because of that failure to acknowledge the 
complexity of contemporary societies, Habermas and Rawls thought that these exchanges 
would be the only applicable form of communication in deliberative democracy. That this 
would result in uniform preference change and would result in consensus formation. That is a 
key similarity for Habermas and Rawls, despite their differences on how they see public 
reason operating and public reason’s normative foundations.  
That was the first generation. This leads, of course, to the second generation. This 
second generation is embodied by deliberative democrats like James Bohman (1996) and 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), among others. They were the ones that started 
to consider the institutionalization of deliberative democracy much more seriously than 
Habermas and Rawls did. In doing so they took the complexity of contemporary societies 
into account in reforming the theory of deliberative democracy. Bohman, Gutmann, and 
Thompson fused the first generation of deliberative democracy with these practical 
requirements and transformed deliberative democracy in the process. Although the second-
generation thinkers see that preferences will adapt to public reason and new information, as 
Habermas and Rawls suggested, they don’t see this as occurring in a uniform manner due to 
the diversity and plurality of societies. Not everybody is going to develop the same 
preferences to the same reason. Therefore, consensus isn’t going to be achieved.  
Not only that, other forms of communication, other means of exchange, should be 
included. This is a response by deliberative democrats to the criticisms leveled at the theory 
by the likes of Iris Marion Young (2000), Lynn Sanders (1997), and the difference 
democrats, who said that relying solely on public reason as the only form of communication 
for deliberation can actually exclude subordinate and minority groups. The exclusive nature 
of communication in deliberation would make it, in the sense of the difference democrats, 
less democratic because it would be biased to those individuals and groups that practice the 
convention of communicating through reason. Deliberative democrats have taken on board 
these criticisms. This is a key aspect to the second generation. Other types of communication 
came to be included. This includes storytelling, rhetoric and greeting. These other forms of 
communication don’t displace public reason, as perhaps some of the more radical difference 
democrats would have liked to have seen. They are, rather, included alongside public reason. 
Transforming deliberative democracy in this manner made it a much more practical theory. It 
increased the potential of deliberative democracy to be actualized in complex societies.  
Bohman, Gutmann, and Thompson and the other second-generation deliberative 
democrats therefore transformed the theory to make it more practical. But they didn’t 
substantively engage with the nitty-gritty of deliberative democracy’s institutional design. 
That is where the third generation has come in. It is preoccupied with the specifics of how 
different institutions would operate deliberatively and democratically. In the turn into this 
third generation, we have actually seen a proliferation of different deliberative processes and 
events. These are occurring all over the world—the evidence of which has been, and 
continues to be, subject to empirical scrutiny. We now have a large amount of empirical 
evidence on which to form the third generation of deliberative democracy. And I think the 
theory’s transformation has a great deal to do with its engagement of practice. That 
engagement is what is leading to this breakup of deliberative democracy. 
And as I mentioned before, I have tried to offer a general, scalar definition of 
deliberative democracy—one that can incorporate a number of these different interpretations 
but at the same time still provides a sortal definition. A conversation between two groups 
does not make that an instance of deliberative democracy. The third generation promotes an 
institutional design of deliberative democracy that accepts the plural nature of public reason. 
This has led to concerns with self-interest and the need to have a broader understanding of 
communication beyond just reasonable exchange. In some ways this breakup of deliberative 
democracy, its diversity, has made it a more universal theory. Deliberative democracy is now 
a less specific, distinct model of democracy. It has much more in common now than it did 
before (in its first generation, for example) with other models such as liberal democracy. 
Deliberative democracy has generalized to an extent. The breakup of it has led to it being 
more ecumenical in a way—it is certainly a less distinct model.  
We should discuss whether that is a good thing or a bad thing. It is both. It means that 
deliberative democracy has become more practical and more relevant to a range of contexts, 
situations, and processes. At the same time, because deliberative democracy has become less 
distinct, we risk losing those normative foundations established by the first generation: 
Habermas and Rawls. While we want the theory to be practical, we don’t want to lose what 
was seen as being good about deliberative democracy in the first place. Its normative appeals 
are what really caught people’s imaginations back in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Gagnon: I agree. We have to be very careful not to lose the theory’s normative foundations in 
our appreciation of its recent epistemic bloom. I wonder—where does John Dryzek fit into 
your heuristic of deliberative democracy’s three generations?Elstub: That’s a good question. I 
would say that he is simultaneously part of the second and third generations. I think Dryzek 
(e.g., 1994, 2002, 2006, 2010,2013; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009) is a definite leader in having 
brought deliberative democracy into the third generation—particularly for the empirical turn 
in deliberative democracy. He is drawing on a wide range of empirical evidence, perhaps 
more so than Bohman (1996) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996). He has taken a distinct 
approach to the interpretation of Habermas, and his reform of this theory has made a 
significant contribution to the second generation of deliberative democracy. For example his 
work has highlighted the centrality of discourses to Habermas’ theory and deliberative 
democracy more generally. He even sometimes calls it “discursive” democracy rather than 
“deliberative” democracy. Although he does still use “discursive” democracy, he has 
accepted that “deliberation” is what the majority of the people in the field are calling it. One 
of his latest works is, for example, the Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative 
Governance (2010). Along with Simon Niemeyer he has advanced our understanding of the 
relationship of public reason to consensus. Here they argue that although deliberation is 
unlikely to result in consensus a ‘meta-consensus’ can be produced which includes 
recognition and acceptance of the legitimacy of disputed values and beliefs, and agreement 
on the nature of disputed choices (Niemeyer  & Dryzek  2007). In sum Dryzek has helped 
mould the theory of deliberative democracy to make it more practical and therefore 
contributed significantly to the second generation. Moreover, his discursive/deliberative 
approach has institutional implications, particularly at the global level, and this has enabled 
him to contribute to the third generation of deliberative democracy too. He places a primary 
role on civil society to institutionalise deliberative democracy, and has outlined how they can 
produce global deliberative public spheres that can hold international decision-making bodies 
to account (Dryzek 2006). In addition, he has also advanced our understandings of 
minipublics, one of the most lauded and practiced methods to try to institutionalize 
deliberative democracy. A minipublic is effectively a group of diverse people chosen through 
random sampling. This group is typically asked to deliberate about an issue and come to a 
consensus through a shift in preferences based on reason-able exchange. Dryzek’s point is not 
about how diverse the people you have are, but rather about how diverse their discourses are. 
Therefore he advocates a ‘chamber of discourses’ where selection is made to guarantee a 
diverse range of discourses rather than a diverse range of people. That’s the key to his 
approach to deliberation, and I have a lot of sympathy for this argument. However, I’m not 
convinced a chamber of discourse could gain the trust of the public to the same extent as 
more traditional mini-publics. Therefore, in many ways Dryzek bridges the second and third 
generations. 
There is more to the categories I have enumerated, those three generations of 
deliberative democracy. Those generations are a heuristic that I use to show the history and 
current practice of deliberative democracy. Other heuristics exist. Deliberative democracy 
has, for instance, been summed up by André Bächtiger, Simon Niemeyer, Michael Neblo, 
Jürg Steiner, and Marco R. Steenbergen (2010), who give a distinction between type I and 
type II deliberation. We can relate Bächtiger et al.’s two types with the three generations 
discussed above. The first generation of deliberative democrats say much of the same as type 
I deliberation. Both prioritize public reason above all forms of communication. Both see this 
as something that will result in uniform preference change and that that preference change 
will result in a decision geared toward the common good. That would be the type I way: talk, 
conversation, and information sharing do not necessarily directly qualify as deliberation. 
There’s something more than that. Deliberation requires certain standards of rational 
justification.  
But then, in light of the criticisms from the difference democrats I mentioned before, 
you see the emergence of type II deliberation, where it’s not just rational discourses included 
but other types of communication, like storytelling, rhetoric and greeting.  Type II is not 
necessarily a repudiation of type I, but it does change the essence of deliberation. It makes 
deliberation perhaps easier to achieve in practice—which is what I articulated about the 
importance of the second generation. For my part, I think these unformed communications 
are part of deliberation. Storytelling, for example, should be included. But although non- or 
less rational communications are necessary, they are not sufficient. For instance, if you have 
solely reason exchange you will have deliberation. If you have solely storytelling (a form of 
rhetorical exchange) you will not have deliberation. Reason is necessary. It has to be there. 
As discussed, reason in itself is sufficient to ensure deliberation, but insufficient to ensure 
deliberative democracy’s practicality. These other forms of communication can be part of 
deliberation, they can indeed improve it and make it more inclusive, but they are not 
essential.  
The focus on institutionalization in the third generation (maybe in the future we will 
come to see an articulation of type III) is where the main parts of the breakup of deliberative 
democracy’s theory occur. There are huge differences here in how people think deliberative 
democracy should be institutionalized. Should it be a focus on citizens and citizens’ 
participation? Or is it something for elites and professional politicians to engage in? Can we 
look to establish institutions such as parliaments and public hearings and so on as forms of 
deliberative democracy? Or do we need to engage in democratic innovation and use 
participatory budgeting and minipublics? Should the forums be partisan, where people in 
conflict are pitted against each other to make a decision? Or should we use nonpartisan 
forums, like minipublics, where it is up to a random sample of the population that don’t have 
a stake or an interest in the decision to deliberate?  
There are also the distinctions between micro and macro approaches to deliberative 
democracy, a distinction from Carolyn Hendriks (2006). The micro approach, , is about 
staying focused on institutionalized decision making, face-to-face, synchronous dialogue with 
a clear output and decision at the end. The macro approach to institutionalization sees 
deliberation in the public sphere and across civil societies where there is an asynchronous 
exchange in discourses across time and space—where there isn’t necessarily a need to 
formally institutionalize deliberation. Deliberation falls outside of the state and often against 
the state. It is not necessarily leading to final decisions. It doesn’t have a clear or direct link to 
final decisions. I think we need elements of both but also elements of all of those different 
approaches that I listed above. That is perhaps where we are seeing the discord of deliberative 
democracy. 
The discord in deliberative democracy, over what way is the best way forward for its 
praxis, has I think led to the idea of the deliberative system—an idea that is being developed, 
for example, by Jane Mansbridge and John Parkinson (2012). The central idea behind the 
deliberative system is that we don’t just want one focus, one forum, one type of institution to 
be deliberative. We need a deliberative system, and that means a division of labour for 
communicative activity that occurs in a diversity of spaces, and the need to sequence all of these 
different spaces so that they become part of an interconnected system. Some institutions and 
parts will achieve some of the norms of deliberative democracy, others will achieve others, 
but all the norms will not be produced in one place at one time. Therefore, we need to try to 
sequence them to try to achieve a deliberative system where institutions can have their 
performance measured against the total norms. We need a combination of citizens and elites. 
We need a combination of established institutions and democratic innovations. We need 
partisan and nonpartisan forums. We need the micro and the macro spheres. We need it all.  
I think the challenge is centered on how we might come to combine all of these 
different institutions and processes to achieve this deliberative system. Although deliberative 
democracy has fragmented, it seems to perhaps be unifying again around certain concepts—
the deliberative system being one of them.  
 
The implications for our understanding of deliberative democracy that a systems 
approach brings should not be underestimated. It is highly significant, and could even lead to 
a fourth generation of deliberative democracy. It is too early to say at this stage at the 
ramifications of the systemic approach are still emerging. Nevertheless, as with the 
progression through the previous generations of deliberative democracy, the systemic 
approach makes deliberative democracy more practical and easier to achieve. Indeed all the 
elements of deliberative democracy no longer need to be approximated in one place at one 
time. It means that talk that is not ostensibly deliberative can play an important role in the 
system. It means demonstrations and non-dialogic communication are crucial to a 
deliberative system. As Owen and Smith (2013) recently highlighted this means we could 
have a ‘deliberative system’ where no deliberation actually takes place and this would be 
perverse. Once again then as the theory of deliberative democracy does become more 
practical in its latest systemic generation it also becomes more general and less distinctive to 
other models and approaches to democracy. 
 
Gagnon: I think there’s a lot to be said about that—about fragmentation and unification. The 
discourse of democratic theory has, for example, been blown into a million bits of literature. 
All of these bits in their immense totality feel chaotic. There’s little to no way, for example, 
for a scholar of democracy to come to know them all. But there seems to be the possibility for 
unifying them. This unification, a cosmopolitan endeavor at its heart, could provide for a 
shared mind-dependent decision about what democracy’s objective truth will be—something 
that will most likely change 300 or 500 years from now (for more, see Gagnon 2013). I like 
the genealogy of deliberative democracy that you have given us through two heuristics: your 
three generations and Bächtiger et al.’s two types. It seems that we have reached the apex of 
deliberative democracy’s theory, where it has answered its critics, it has resisted having its 
original meaning lost; and now it is looking for its empirical self. It is chasing operability, 
practicability, and quality performance in the institutions to which deliberative democracy is 
most relevant. Its diversity is being sequenced as a means to a systemic end. What we have 
here is evidence of the engineering of deliberative democracy.  
 
Elstub: I think what we’re seeing, and this might hold true for most theories of democracy, 
although that is something I need to think further about, is that the distinctiveness of the 
different models of democracy is reducing. Deliberative democracy is a way of 
demonstrating this. The distinctiveness of deliberative democracy as it has moved through 
these three generations has made the theory more compatible with liberal approaches to 
democracy. It does have connections with associational democracy, as discussed before. It 
does incorporate a number of elements stemming from the agonistic theory of democracy. As 
a result, deliberative democracy is becoming less distinct in relation to these other models. 
But the same might be said about the other models—they too are becoming less distinct.  
This domination of deliberative democracy, not in practice but in academia, has had a 
significant effect on the understandings of and approaches to democracy in these other 
models. Possibly as a result of this growth in the shared distinctions between models of 
democracy we see, for example, the articulation made by Michael Saward (2003) of the need 
for an ecumenical approach to democracy. For me, the most appropriate way to get to this 
ecumenical understanding is by initially focusing on the specific models. As these models 
engage with practice, a dialectical relationship between practice and theory can emerge. In 
order to adapt to the practical requirements of reality, the theoretical models move toward 
each other, and become more similar. In this process models of democracy end up accepting 
certain hard facts while still retaining a normative approach. Although you don’t want to be 
overly realist and simply say, “The world is what it is and we can’t change it,” I believe at the 
same time that there are limitations on what can be changed and limitations on the extent of 
these changes. The various models of democracy are normative, but ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ as 
Robert Goodin (2005) reminds us. This dialectic between theory and practice is at the heart of 
Archon Fung’s (2007) ‘pragmatic equilibrium approach’, which I have myself adapted 
specifically to deliberative democracy (Elstub 2014) 
 
Gagnon: Yes, we can see, for example, the way that different articulations of different 
theories of democracy feed into one another. For example, type I deliberative democracy 
requires the parties involved to have enough information to be capable of making a reason-
able exchange. The need to find this information might be a muckraking endeavor. One party 
might have to employ this journalistic technique to establish their position in reason. That 
activity, though, that necessity of finding sensitive information that will permit a party to be 
in a position of reason, and then to use that information in a deliberative exchange, brings to 
mind the role of the individual citizen in, for example, John Keane’s (2009) theory of 
monitory democracy. 
 
Elstub: I think there are many instances of significant overlaps in all of these models. But, at 
the same time, I do think that having this modelist approach is useful. These models of 
democracy do have distinct normative features and normative foundations while at the same 
time they have major crossovers, especially when they become engaged with practice and 
institutionalization.  
 
Gagnon: This dialectic of overlap and distinctiveness between models of democracy is 
interesting. Recognizing that there are over 50 ways of articulating democracy either as a 
theory, concept, or practice, and that each of these articulations has overlaps and distinctive 
features, leads me to envision that this forms a type of fabric—a cloth of democracy. When 
we look, for example, at a simple cloth we can see two parts to it: flat parts and raised parts. 
The flat parts in this instance are the overlaps between articulations of democracy. And the 
raised parts are their distinct features—their normative aspects.   
 
Elstub: I do see some value in articulating ecumenical approaches to democracy. I am, for 
example, an admirer of Michael Saward’s work (e.g., 1998, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2010 and 
2011). He talks about having a more reflexive approach to the study of democracy. 
Something in practice where we don’t go in with an arsenal of normative values prior to 
looking at what’s happening in democracy. Saward argues for the need to first look at what’s 
happening and take value from that democratic enactment—whether what’s happening is an 
associative or deliberative or any other approach to democracy. And I do have a great deal of 
sympathy for this position. However, I still think that normative interpretations are important 
and I think normative differences are important. I’m not just a scholar of deliberative 
democracy; I’m a believer in it. I do believe that the public reason that’s at the heart of 
deliberative democracy can lead to a deeper, if you like, enactment of democracy. It comes 
back to why you think democracy is a good thing in the first place. There are, of course, a 
number of very different justifications. Justifications exist for all the different models of 
democracy. I, for example, argue that democracy’s value is that it cultivates personal 
autonomy equally (Elstub 2008). Deliberative democracy will cultivate personal autonomy 
more and more equally than other approaches. That doesn’t mean that these other models 
don’t concern themselves about personal autonomy, for they do, but that deliberative 
democracy if it can be achieved in practice will bring about personal autonomy the most.  
If you were to take a different justification of democracy, then you might end up 
favoring a different model or a different approach to democracy. That being said, many have 
argued that deliberative democracy is the fairest procedure. Others have argued that it is the 
model most likely to have epistemic outcomes. There are others that say that deliberative 
democracy is the best for other reasons. I think it’s the best because it is most likely to 
cultivate personal autonomy, and that’s why I think democracy’s a good thing. 
Now, the answer I’ve given is more for the implementation and justification of 
democracy. There’s another part to it. And that’s about how fragmentation might be affecting 
the study of democracy. The fragmentation of theories makes the study of one or more 
theories more difficult. Whereas the literature on, for example, deliberative democracy was 
still readable in its entirety nearly 15 years ago, today it would be near impossible to read all 
that has been written about it due to the rhe sheer volume. And that’s brilliant. It shows how 
important deliberative democracy has become—how it’s captured people’s attention. It’s 
great to see all of this empirical work published about it. That’s exactly what deliberative 
democracy needed.  
That being said, it does make it difficult to keep up with everything in the field.  It 
makes it particularly difficult to keep track of the interpretations of deliberative democracy in 
this big body of literature. Not everyone is using deliberative democracy correctly. Now I 
don’t want to sound like the deliberative democracy police or something like that. But there 
does have to be a boundary over what deliberative democracy means. And I do think that this 
empirical turn in deliberative democracy, as Dryzek (2010) terms it, has bowdlerized some of 
the concepts central to deliberative democracy. So when reading some of these empirical 
works you have to take them into consideration with an especially critical eye. A key 
question to ask is whether this actually is deliberation that is being measured or 
instrumentalized.  
Yet, at the same time, I want that diversity. Going back to my argument about 
sequencing deliberative democracy, lots of different kinds of institutions can contribute to the 
enactment of deliberative democracy. Peter McLaverty and Darrin Halpin wrote, for 
example, “Deliberative Drift” (2008). They argue that institutions that are not ostensibly set 
up to be deliberative can still drift toward deliberative values. Consequently, I think 
deliberative theorists can be looking to all types of different arrangements to see whether they 
are deliberative or capable of this drift. They need to be methodologically innovative to 
determine whether deliberation is occurring in the arrangement being studied. They can’t just 
say, “Oh, there’s dialogue here so deliberation has occurred.” To reiterate deliberative 
democracy is more than that.  
Some measures have, for example, helped in this regard. The Deliberative Quality 
Index (Steenbergen et al. 2003) or Niemeyer  and Dryzek’s (207) and Q-Index can be used to 
determine whether deliberation is occurring—and with what quality or to what extent. All of 
these methods need to be used in conjunction with each other. In another example, Fishkin 
and Luskin (2005) have convincingly shown that preferences change during their deliberative 
polls. But their conclusion that this was the result of deliberation needs further thought. We 
don’t necessarily know that preference change during the polls was the result of deliberation. 
We need to combine these different methods to begin to answer these questions. Fishkin has 
begun this project himself through further innovations to the methods used in his deliberative 
polls (Fishkin 2009).  
 
I think the fragmentation of deliberative democracy has given us the resources and the 
opportunity to gain greater understanding about it, but that it has also made the challenges I 
mentioned above quite difficult to overcome. It does mean at times that people are looking 
for deliberative democracy in the wrong places or using the wrong methods to ascertain 
whether deliberation is actually occurring. The other thing we have to remember is that this is 
deliberative democracy. Not just deliberation. We need to see how democratic these 
processes are. That’s one of the problems with deliberative polling. They are what they are. 
They are a sophisticated form of opinion polls. They can act as a heuristic for policy makers 
and the public, but they rarely influence decision making. There are exceptions in China, 
Bulgaria and in Texas, where they certainly have. But given the huge number of deliberative 
polls there have been, very few have actually influenced decision making. That compromises 
the democratic credentials of it. Basically, the empirical evidence of deliberative democracy 
is both challenging in its demands for innovative methods but also a fantastic resource for 
scholars and practitioners to draw upon.    
 
Gagnon: That’s interesting. I’m curious to know where you see all of this heading. 
 
Elstub: We definitely seem to be going toward this idea of a deliberative system. There has 
not yet been a huge amount published on this, as it is quite a new turn within deliberative 
democracy. Parkinson and Mansbridge (2012) have, for example, published a recent book 
about deliberative systems. It is now not sufficient just to ask, “Is this process deliberative?” 
It’s about how we can combine these to make a whole system deliberative. And I think that 
was implicit in the original ideas of deliberative democracy going back to the first 
generation—Habermas and Rawls—but given the fact that we have focused on specific 
institutions so much in the third generation of deliberative democracy, I think we have lost 
sight of that.  It’s good that we are bringing that original focus back as part of the theorization 
and implementation of deliberative systems. The key recognition is that this turn to the 
deliberative system is building on the third generation. It’s looking to specific institutions and 
empirical evidence while still retaining normative values to try to change practices. 
Consequently, as discussed before the systemic focus to deliberative democracy could 
potentially mark a fourth generation. 
 
Stephen Elstub is a senior lecturer in politics at the University of the West of Scotland. His 
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relation to deliberative democracy and its institutionalization in practice. His is the coeditor 
of the forthcoming book Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases (Edinburgh, 2014). 
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